C. Stephen Evans, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: THINKING ABOUT FAITH by Obitts, Stanley
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 4 Issue 2 Article 12 
4-1-1987 
Evans, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: THINKING ABOUT FAITH 
Stanley Obitts 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Obitts, Stanley (1987) "Evans, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: THINKING ABOUT FAITH," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol4/iss2/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
224 Faith and Philosophy 
also suggestions for alternate concrete categories. Without a self-conscious, 
historically understood, practice of moving between abstractions and concrete 
phenomena, it is impossible to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Guilt 
is too concrete, I believe, to be generalizable as an essential characteristic of 
religion. 
To accept the protection of abstraction against bias and dogmatism may well 
be to abandon phenomenology of religion as a discipline with its own integrity. 
Westphal makes no exclusive claims for it, and his practice here is very helpful 
for its purpose. I would hope, however, that he would now tum his considerable 
talents and erudition to a more inclusive philosophy of religion. 
Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith, by C. Stephen Evans. Downers 
Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1985. Pp. 191. $6.95. 
STANLEY OBITTS, Westmont College. 
This book is one of the "Contours of Christian Philosophy" series of which Prof. 
Evans is also the editor. The series describes itself as consisting of "short, 
introductory-level textbooks," a description which accurately fits this book. Yet 
the book is far from superficial, is up-to-date, is very readable, and is remarkeably 
thorough for its size. 
The thrust of the book is a Christian justification of religious belief. Right 
from the beginning the stance of the book on the relation of faith and reason is 
made clear. Fideism is rejected because it denies the common ground with the 
nonbeliever required for genuine reflection on religion. The presuppositionless 
approach of neutralism is found equally unsatisfactory for it ignores what weak 
foundationalism recognizes, namely, that reason is "a willingness to test one's 
commitments." The approach said to be taken in the book is that of a "critical 
dialog" with the nonbeliever, always open to his objections. 
Little more than an "impasse" is promised in the dialog, however. For example, 
in Malcolm's version of the ontological argument the weak premise is said to 
be the one holding that God's existence is possible (not impossible), because 
the nonbeliever supposedly would not accept it. And since the criterion of rational 
conviction is "person relative," the dialog breaks down. But is the theistic God's 
existence impossible? If not, then it must be possible, which is all Malcolm's 
argument needs. If the nonbeliever refuses to admit this, then at least he should 
be made to feel the onus of breaking off the dialog for no good reason. Perhaps 
the sllccess of an argument should not be so tightly linked with its being convincing 
to a given individual. One could be so intent on maintaining the posture of 
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"critical dialog" with the nonbeliever that the significance for truth of the sound-
ness of an argument is underplayed. 
The diffidence displayed in natural theology vanishes when an appeal is made 
to religious experience and special revelation. Non-mystical, psychologically 
immediate, experiences of God mediated through his creation, his acts in history, 
a hymn, etc., are held to provide prima-facie evidence, which, having been 
checked against overriders, can be considered ultima-facie evidence. A similar 
confidence comes through the receipt of special revelation, with its "'authen-
ticating miracles. '" Where such appeals leave the dialog with the nonbeliever is 
not clear. 
The book concludes with a balanced, sensitive treatment of the role one's 
personal faith plays in the "critical dialog" with the nonbeliever and his objections. 
The believer is advised to make a cumulative case a la Basil Mitchell, based on 
"less-than-algorithmic evidence" admitting of logical, and a modicum of existen-
tial, doubt. 
Given the limitations in length and readers' background, the treatment of the 
religious language problem could have been shortened in favor of the chapter 
on objections to theism. Not only would this have made a somewhat compressed 
chapter more understandable to the neophyte, but it would impress the nonbeliever 
with the seriousness with which the dialog with him is being taken. Nonetheless, 
the book is an authoritative, concise survey of the subject which should be 
unusually effective in making the Christian faith more "rationally convincing." 
Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. 2nd edition. 
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984. Pp. 161. 
GARY GUTTING, University of Notre Dame. 
The first edition (1976) of Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason Within the Bounds of 
Religion dealt with the intellectual integrity of Christian scholarship. Its main 
thesis was that Christian doctrine may and should act as a constraint on the sorts 
of positions a Christian scholar holds in his area of expertise. This thesis conflicts 
with the standard modem view of inquiry as the unrestricted pursuit of truth 
wherever evidence and argument lead. Wolterstorff maintained that the ideal of 
unrestrained inquiry is defensible only on the basis of epistemological found-
ationalism; only, that is, if there is available a body of certainties (the foundation 
of knowledge) from which all valid knowledge claims can be derived. He attacked 
foundationalism, arguing first that foundationalists have given no adequate ex-
plication of how knowledge claims are derived from the foundations and, second, 
